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Abstract 
 
The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the 
agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its 
conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After 
this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the 
first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid 
Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution 
because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non-
descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, does not answer the pressing 
concern behind Parfit’s charge. I conclude that we had better turn to the 
third response: Peter Railton’s vindicatory reductionism. However, I 
also argue that naturalism can only avoid triviality in this way if it is 
able to respond to further challenges concerning the vindication of the 
reduction it proposes. Hence, though not a knockdown argument as it is 
intended to be, Parfit’s charge can still pose a threat to naturalist 
accounts of normativity. 
 
I. Naturalism and Parfit’s objection 
 
Ethical naturalists hold that normative judgments owe their 
normativity to the facts they refer to in the natural world. Not 
everyone is happy with this claim, however. Derek Parfit has 
recently attacked naturalism through its ‘substance’; he has claimed 
that the problem with naturalism is its insistence on reducing ethical 
properties to natural properties. This is a problem, he thinks, because 
reduction trivializes the agent’s practical reasoning and thus 
abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. My aim in this paper is 
to investigate this objection. To this end, we first need a suitable 
account of what ethical naturalism (from now on: naturalism) is and 
in this context we then have to locate Parfit’s charge. This will be 
the topic of the present section. After this, in the second section I 
consider three responses to Parfit’s objection. Detailed analysis of 
these attempts leads me to the claim that naturalism can only avoid 
Parfit’s charge if it is able to respond to the challenge of vindication. 
I thus conclude that while Parfit’s charge does not qualify as a 
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knock-down argument against naturalism, it may nevertheless cause 
trouble for it. 
We do best in understanding contemporary naturalism by 
introducing a distinction between methodological and substantive 
naturalism. (Railton 1990, p. 155; 1993b, p. 315) On the former 
view, naturalism adopts an a posteriori explanatory approach to an 
area of human practice or discourse such as epistemology, semantics 
or ethics; on the latter view, naturalism proposes an interpretation of 
the concepts in some area of practice or discourse in terms of natural 
properties or relations. Since it is notoriously difficult to define what 
a natural property is, I will not attempt to give a precise definition. 1 
Instead, I will act on the supposition that such an account can be 
given. This assumption is not only needed to get the argument going 
but is also legitimate given the similar definitional problems other 
realist theories, particularly non-naturalist accounts have to face. 
Finally, since my aim in this paper is to attack naturalism and not to 
defend it, making the assumption also makes my argument more 
charitable from the naturalist point of view. 
Let me first turn to methodological naturalism. There are two 
things to note here. First, someone can be a methodological 
naturalist without being a substantive naturalist - think of Allan 
Gibbard’s evolutionary grounding of norm-expressivism or Richard 
Hare’s defence of prescriptivism on the basis of linguistic intuitions. 
Second, a substantive naturalist need not be naturalist in the 
methodological sense. In particular, certain naturalists use a priori 
conceptual analysis as their method. Three attempts deserve 
particular attention. David Lewis gives a direct naturalistic definition 
of value, while both Michael Smith and Frank Jackson employ a 
two-stage analysis.2 (Lewis 1989; Jackson 1998, Chapters 5-6; Smith 
1994, Chapter 2) The idea is to see whether ethical concepts 
                                                 
1 There are many attempts in the offing. A popular choice is to say that natural 
properties are those with which it is the business of the natural sciences, or of 
psychology to deal, or which can be completely defined in the terms of these. See 
Moore (1903), p. 25; Wiggins (1993), p. 303; Smith (1994), p. 17; Copp (2003). But 
there are other attempts in the literature. For a good overview of different definitions 
and the difficulties they face see Ridge (2003).   
2 We should note that there is an important difference between their accounts of the 
process, which concerns the reductiveness of the conceptual phase. Jackson’s 
‘network-analysis’ is given in reductive, natural terms, whereas Smith’s ‘summary-
style’ analysis does not refrain from using normative, unreduced terms. See Jackson 
(1998), Chapter 5; Smith (1994) Chapter 2 for details.  
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(conceptual stage) do indeed instantiate in the world (substantive 
stage). To use Smith’s example, if we want to know whether there 
are witches in the world, we first clarify our concept of a witch: we 
set up conditions a person has to fulfil in order to qualify as a witch. 
Then, armed with these conditions, we check if there is anyone in 
our world who fulfils these conditions, that is, if there are witches in 
our world. (Smith 1994, p. 64) 
Next is substantive naturalism. The two main approaches here 
are analytical naturalism and non-analytical naturalism. The former 
has four characteristics. (Jackson 1998, p. 144-6) First, it rejects any 
form of methodological naturalism and opts for conceptual analysis 
with all the variations mentioned above. Second, it can be neutral on 
whether the analysis in the conceptual phase gives the meaning of 
the ethical term in the descriptive sense, i.e. the meaning of a term is 
given by the property that a competent speaker associates with it, or 
it only causally fixes its reference in Kripke’s sense. Third, it allows 
that the discovery of the identity between ethical and non-ethical 
properties in the substantive phase might take place a posteriori, i.e. 
empirically. Fourth, it can but need not hold that the identities thus 
discovered are themselves analytic and thus a priori. Finally, in all 
cases, whenever meaning in the descriptive sense is concerned, two 
options are open. (Brink 1989, p. 152-3) Either the ethical term is 
synonymous with the non-ethical term in which case ethical 
properties are identical with non-ethical properties; or the non-
ethical term implies the meaning of the ethical term in which case 
ethical properties form a subset of non-ethical properties.  
Non-analytical naturalism comprises of two positions. One is 
the idea of reforming definitions. It is similar to analytical naturalism 
in that it appeals to an a priori analysis of ethical terms but is 
different from it in that it doesn’t intend its account to be an analysis 
of our actual use of the term but rather as a substitute for it. (Brandt 
1979, Chapter 1; Rawls 1971, 60-63§) The other position is non-
analytical naturalism proper: it makes no claim about meaning, only 
about properties. It comes in two distinct forms. Either it is the view 
that ethical properties are reducible to natural properties and we can 
give synthetic identity statements about them. (Railton 1997, 2003a) 
Or it is the claim that ethical properties are not reducible to natural 
properties, though they are nothing over and above natural 
properties. (Sturgeon 1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b; Boyd 1988, 
Miller 1979, 1985; Brink 1989, Chapter 6) Non-analytical 
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naturalism achieves this by denying two theses. One is the 
descriptive theory of meaning mentioned above; the other is the 
claim that all necessary truths are analytical. It instead settles for 
Kripke’s causal theory of reference and holds that there are a 
posteriori necessities. As the comparison shows, it is this last claim 
that really distinguishes it from analytical naturalism. 3 
We now have a proper understanding of naturalism at hand. It 
is time to turn to Parfit’s objection. 4 (Parfit 1997, pp. 123-4) Applied 
to the analytical version of what we may call the Desire-Based 
Reasons Model (or, for short, the Model), the objection takes the 
following form.5 The normative claim:  
(1) P is a reason for A to f   
 
means 
 
(2) There is some e such that A actually desires e, and, given that 
p, f -ing subserves the prospect of e’s being realized (or 
continuing to be realized). 
 
                                                 
3 We can compare this with the terminology of others. Michael Smith’s ‘definitional 
naturalism’ is what I call analytical naturalism where analysis is wholly reductive, 
while his ‘metaphysical naturalism’ corresponds to my non-analytical naturalism. See 
Smith (1994), pp. 26-7. Frank Jackson’s ‘analytical descriptivism’ covers those 
analytical naturalist views where analysis is given in purely reductive terms, his 
‘metaphysical naturalism’ is my substantive naturalism that includes both analytical 
and non-analytical versions and his ‘ontological naturalism’ corresponds to my non-
analytical naturalism. See Jackson (1998), p. 146. Finally, what Darwall, Gibbard and 
Railton (1997), pp. 24-30 calls post-positivist non-reductionism includes analytical 
views that allow for meaning implication as well non-analytical theories that opt for 
constitution; and what they call reductionism includes analytical views that restrict 
discussion to synonymy as well as non-analytical accounts that favour identity.     
4 The objection first appears in a footnote in Sidgwick (1907), p. 26n. Gibbard (1990), 
p. 33 also makes use of it in his rejection of naturalism. A detailed presentation of the 
argument, one to which my discussion owes a lot, could be found in the earlier 
version of Parfit (ms), Chapter 2; it is, however, no longer included in the pre-ultimate 
draft of the manuscript.     
5 Parfit, among other views, also uses the Model as his example, but he gives two 
competing formulations, both different from the one I use above and which I borrow 
from Dancy (2000), p. 28. Hence my move above amounts to a simplification of 
Parfit’s discussion. But since Parfit’s problem concerns the reductionism of the 
Model, details of formulation don’t matter from his perspective. About these details 
see Dancy (2000), pp. 15-19, 26-29; Hubin (1996), (1999), (2003); Noggle (1999).  
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If we accept (2), Parfit claims, we can no longer believe that we have 
a reason to do what satisfies our desires. We can only believe that to 
satisfy our desires is to satisfy them and this is a tautology that 
makes practical reason claims trivial and thus non-normative. We 
can call this, following Parfit, the triviality objection. 
This might be obscure, so let me put this point in a different 
way. Take the example of Joe who wants to climb Mount Everest. 
According to the model, his reasoning would have the following 
form: 
 
(3) Climbing Mount Everest satisfies a desire of mine that I now 
have 
 
given that 
 
(4) When applied to acts, the term ‘I have a reason to f ’ means, “I 
actually desire e, and f -ing subserves the prospect of e’s being 
realized (or continuing to be realized)”  
 
I conclude 
 
(5) I have a reason to climb Mount Everest. 
 
The triviality objection says the following. Joe’s conclusion in (5), 
though through a further premise (4), only restates his premise in (3). 
Can the truth of (4) help the naturalist out? It cannot. Since (4) is a 
definitional truth, it uses the very same concepts and designates the 
same properties, as does (3). Therefore it makes the concept of 
reason redundant, a mere abbreviation for ‘satisfies my desire that I 
now have’. But it just cannot matter to show how a certain term, in 
this case the term ‘reason’, is used. It simply does not make a 
difference if we show that we can refer to some longer term in a 
shorter, more convenient way: that we can use the word ‘reason’ for 
it. But unless these concerns receive an answer, Joe cannot properly 
believe that he has a reason to act if and only if acting satisfies a 
desire of his; he can only believe that to satisfy his desires is to 
satisfy those desires, full stop. And this, as it stands, abolishes the 
normativity of his belief: he cannot believe that he should do what 
his desires command him to do. So he cannot believe, as a particular 
instance of it, that he should climb Mount Everest.  
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So far we have only considered the analytical version of the 
Model. Is it not possible that non-analytical naturalism can 
somehow avoid triviality? After all, it is ‘easy’ (technically, not 
philosophically) to formulate the Model as stating a synthetic truth, 
so it is important to see whether such a shift in substance can help. 
Parfit thinks it cannot. His point is this. (Ibid.) Take our previous 
example and give it a non-analytical turn. Instead of (4), the non-
analytical premise would then be: 
 
(6) As another way of reporting the natural fact or ascribe the 
property (3) refers to, I can say that there is a reason for me to 
climb, or that I should climb.  
 
But again: (6) only says that (3) could be expressed in another way; 
otherwise it reports the same fact. That is, to say that climbing fulfils 
Joe’s desire and to say that he should climb is to report the same 
fact. And, though now the terms (3) and (5) uses are different, they 
are not different in the relevant respect: they are both descriptive, 
expressing beliefs of the agent, which, by property identity, are 
about the same part of the natural world. Consequently, (5) adds 
nothing to Joe’s original reasoning: from the perspective of the 
triviality objection it makes no difference whether triviality arises 
because (3) and (5) mean the same or because the two report the 
same fact. Hence the non-analytical form of the Model is just as 
much unable to account for the normativity of reason-claims as does 
the analytical version.  
The triviality objection as presented here is different from 
well-known objections against naturalism. To begin with, it makes 
no claim about the impossibility of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. 
This claim, traditionally known as the ‘is/ought’ thesis, has two 
interpretations, one logical (no normative statements can be derived 
from statements that involve no normative terms), the other 
motivational (normative judgments necessarily motivate, hence 
cannot be derived from statements of facts). (Brink 1989, pp. 145-9; 
Smith 1994, pp. 190-3; Jackson 1998, pp. 139-142) The triviality 
objection, however, requires no mention of either logical or 
motivational mistakes. Although in a sense it is also about how to 
bridge the gap between the normative and the non-normative, it need 
not postulate either of these failures to make its point. Furthermore, 
it is perhaps less obvious but is still clear enough that the triviality 
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objection is different from Moore’s open question argument. Very 
schematically, in Moore’s view no naturalist definition of normative 
terms is adequate since such definitions always leave questions 
about what is right, rational etc. open and this would be impossible if 
they were to function as definitions. (Moore 1903, pp. 10-21; Ayer 
1936, pp. 103-106; Brink 1989, pp. 152-3, 162-3) The triviality 
objection, however, is not dependent upon claims about meaning. It 
has troubles with the reductionist element in naturalism and as such 
it is indifferent to whether that reduction takes an analytic or non-
analytic form.     
Also, the triviality objection poses a real challenge to the 
naturalist. I emphasize this because one might wonder whether the 
naturalist really needs to look for a response to the triviality 
objection. More precisely, the naturalist might give a response, but a 
debunking one. He can admit that his understanding of normativity 
is trivial, but add that he has no problem with this view of 
normativity and, if it comes to that, he is willing to bite the bullet. 
The alternative, non-trivial view of normativity, he can point out, 
might be a valid one but to appeal to is question-begging. At the 
moment we just have two competing readings of normativity and an 
independent argument is needed to prove the truth (or falsity) of 
either.6 I don’t think this is so. The issue here, rather, is where the 
onus of proof lies and I believe it lies on the naturalist side. This is 
because our ordinary understanding of normativity goes beyond the 
account the naturalist so happily embraces. I don’t know how to 
prove this, but it seems to me that accepting the naturalist proposal 
would leave normative inquiry impoverished. (cf. Gibbard 1990, p. 
33-4) We think – again, this is my impression - that when one 
reasons about what to do, one takes oneself to arrive at a genuine 
normative conclusion, not just a repetition of what was already 
involved in one’s premises. It is this phenomenon the triviality 
objection articulates and that naturalists must account for. 
 
II. Three responses to Parfit’s objection 
 
                                                 
6 Many have put this response to me on behalf of the naturalist (regardless whether 
they are naturalist themselves). I remember Tony Booth and Kaj Strandberg, in 
particular.  
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I see three ways naturalists can accomplish this task. I first 
deal with the two that are unsuccessful leaving the third, more 
promising one to the end. The response that immediately comes to 
mind is that naturalists need not be reductionist, but can also endorse 
some form of irreductionism. That is, they need not hold that the 
relation between properties is that of identity; instead, they can say 
that ethical properties are irreducible properties, though they are 
nothing over and above natural properties. In this case the triviality 
objection does not work. To take Joe’s argument above, his 
conclusion reports an ethical fact that is not identical with the natural 
fact that his premise designates, but is still not itself an additional 
property. Consequently, Joe’s reasoning is not trivial; hence its 
conclusion preserves normativity.  
Let me set aside the issue whether the irreductionist move 
could avoid collapsing into reductionism. 7 There is another, equally 
serious problem lying here. To see it, we should turn to metaphysics. 
Here we first find that the irreductionist approach is anything but 
self-evident. Irreductionists normally appeal to supervenience in 
picturing the relation between ethical and natural properties. 
However, this is an idea that forms part of many positions other than 
irreductionist naturalism and these positions view it differently. 
(Darwall, Gibbard and Railton 1997, p. 27) Reductionist naturalists 
think that the ethical supervenes on the non-ethical because the two 
are identical; non-naturalists claim that the ethical supervenes on the 
non-ethical because the ethical is non-natural; finally, non-
cognitivists deny that supervenience would occur on the level of 
properties at all and instead claim that it holds between concepts. So 
the irreductionist reading of supervenience certainly needs further 
explanation.  
The only attempt I know of to explain this strong relation 
between properties in irreductionist terms is David Brink’s notion of 
constitutional supervenience. (Brink 1989, pp. 157-8) He gives two 
                                                 
7 The dilemma hidden here is this. Irreductionism insists that it is still a form of 
naturalism. But if it is, then one can start to wonder whether it is really different from 
reductionism. After all, if inseparability is enough to save naturalism, what difference 
remains between the two approaches? Along general lines, both Parfit (ms: earlier 
draft), Chapter 2 and Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1997), pp. 27 poses this question. 
In my discussion I set aside this reaction because it doesn’t answer the crucial 
ontological challenge: that even if entities do not exist independently, they are still 
separate ontologically – and this is enough for the irreductionist strategy to get off the 
ground. I thank János Kis for pressing me on this point.     
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reasons to support the proposal. Both are versions of the multiple 
realization argument and appeal to an analogy with other fields. The 
first is introduced like this:  
 
“For example, a table is constituted by, but not identical with, 
a particular arrangement of microphysical particles, since the 
table could survive certain changes in its particles or their 
arrangement. Similarly, moral properties are constituted by, 
but not identical with, natural properties if, though actually 
realized by natural properties, moral properties can be or could 
have been realized by properties not studied by the natural or 
social sciences.” (Brink 1989, p. 158)  
 
The question is whether this example does the work Brink wants it 
to do. I think it does not. The reason is the following. 
Brink’s example employs an understanding of property that 
appears to be metaphysically flawed. (McNaughton and Rawling 
2003, pp. 39-40) He mentions a physical object and compares it to a 
property. It is, moreover, important for Brink that the analogy is 
between these two entities and not between two properties, i.e. the 
property of being a table and the property of being right. 8 For it is 
hard to see how he can get the kind of relation he is postulating 
between microphysical particles and properties: these are just two 
different kinds of things. If, however, he employs the analogy in its 
original form, he puts himself in trouble. This is because, 
metaphysically speaking, objects ‘behave’ differently than 
properties. Let me explain. Take the three rival metaphysical 
theories. On nominalism, there are no such things as properties: only 
concrete particulars exist that can only be in one place at any given 
time, and only one of them can be in the same place at the same 
time. Hence this ‘understanding’ of property would not help Brink to 
establish his analogy. On realism, properties do have an independent 
existence but they are taken to be abstract universals: they can be at 
many places at the same time, and many of them can be in the same 
place at the same time. This means that one can move from world to 
world and identify instances of properties just as one can identify 
tables. But one cannot identify an entire property throughout the 
possible worlds: properties are trans-world entities and thus are 
unsuitable for Brink’s purposes.  
                                                 
8 Both Gianfranco Pellegrino and Anders Strand asked me why the alternative reading is not possible.  
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Can we find refuge in the third of the theories, trope theory? I 
doubt it. On this view there are such things as properties (qua 
realism), but they are particulars and not universals (qua 
nominalism). More precisely, a property is taken to be a class or set 
of exactly similar or resembling tropes where individual tropes are 
understood as instances of the given property. For a substance to 
have or to instantiate a property is for one of its tropes to exactly 
resemble all of the tropes that comprise that property (or for the set 
of tropes that is the substance to overlap the set of tropes that is the 
property). (McDonald 1998, pp. 35-40) And this shows that trope 
theory cannot provide hope for Brink either. For on this view 
properties are again trans-world entities. One can identify instances 
of properties from world to world just as one can identify tables, but 
one cannot identify a property per se (an entire property, as I called 
it above). Hence Brink’s analogy with the table remains unfounded.  
Nor does the second analogy help his case; in fact, it makes 
things worse. It appeals to the one/many relationship that, according 
to some functionalists in the philosophy of mind, exists between 
mental states and physical systems. Brink’s claim is that we find the 
same situation in morality. He says: “For example, both the property 
of injustice and particular instances of injustice, in whatever social 
and economic conditions they are actually realized, could have been 
realized by a variety of somewhat different configurations of social 
and economic properties and property instances. Moral properties 
could have been realized by indefinite and perhaps infinite sets of 
natural properties.” (Ibid.) Jackson makes a similar proposal. 
(Jackson 1998, p. 141) Recall his (and Smith’s) account of the two-
stage process. Revising his original idea that we have identity 
relations throughout the stages, Jackson at one point says that his 
conceptual analysis tells nothing about the metaphysics of rightness. 
Drawing on the analogy with the distinction between role and 
resultant property in the functionalist theory of mind, he points out 
that the property of rightness need not be identical with the property 
that we find in the world in the substantive phase of the analysis. For 
it might be that the property of rightness is the second-order 
property of having that property.  
However, once one takes over the multiple realization 
argument from the philosophy of mind, one should not be silent 
about what comes with it. In particular, one standard objection 
against irreductionist functionalism seems to have an analogue in 
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ethics as well: Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument. With 
significant simplification, Kim’s claim is that if the first-order 
physical property (‘realizer property’) can be a sufficient cause of a 
physical event (what is called the ‘physical closure’ principle), and 
we suppose that the mental supervenes on the physical in the 
irreductionist way, then there appears to be no causal work left for 
the second-order mental property (‘role property’) to do. (Kim 1999, 
p. 37, 53) It seems that the role causality plays in the mental 
causation debate is taken over by truth in the corresponding ethical 
discussion.9 For Jackson clearly supposes that both first-order 
properties as well as second-order properties can play the role of 
truth-maker in the conceptual phase. (Jackson ibid.) But if this is so, 
then we seem to have no need to complicate the picture by 
introducing the second-order property: there is just no truth-making 
work left for it to do. Its role as a truth-maker is entirely pre-empted 
by the first-order property. The analogy with philosophy of mind is 
thus a dangerous consideration to appeal to.10       
I conclude that irreductionist naturalism must give way to 
reductionist naturalism and then the triviality objection is allowed to 
do its job: we are back where we started. But an advocate of 
naturalism might still find my treatment unfair. He might claim that I 
am forgetting something crucial about the position: that it is a claim 
about concepts, not just about properties. And this is a striking 
omission for naturalists need not hold - what I took them to be 
holding - that ethical concepts are exclusively descriptive. Perhaps 
some form of non-descriptive naturalism is true, and then the 
concepts that appear in the agent’s reasoning will be different in kind 
thereby avoiding the trap of triviality.    
There are three problems with this proposal but they are all 
aspects of the same basic issue. Let us take a closer view at the 
structure of non-descriptivist naturalism. It must navigate between 
two equally unacceptable positions: non-cognitivism on the one 
                                                 
9 I thank Anders Strand for calling my attention, even if indirectly and perhaps not 
deliberately, to the possible analogy between the two fields. 
10 To be fair, we must note that Jackson himself favours the reductionist reading. Here 
is what he says about rightness (referring to Smith 1994, pp. 74-6): “We want 
rightness to be what makes an action right, not in the causal sense but in the sense of 
being what ought to be aimed at… [W]hat ought to motivate us, and what we should 
value and pursue, is not the moral status of our actions per se, but the goods that 
confer the moral status.” See Jackson (1998), p. 141. Hence, he concludes, we’d better 
opt for first-order properties instead of the second-order properties that possess them.  
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hand and descriptivist naturalism on the other. The way it does this 
is by combining the non-descriptivism of the former with the realism 
of the latter. The result is a hybrid view according to which the 
semantic role of ethical predicates is both to refer to robust ethical 
properties and to express some non-cognitive state of mind. There 
are well-known difficulties with constructing a defensible non-
descriptivist side (basically all the relevant objections to non-
cognitivism belong here, plus some specific claims concerning 
certain naturalist proposals), but there is another problem 
characteristic of this position only: how to combine the different 
aspects so that they fit properly together? Keeping them separate 
without establishing any connection between them seems a rather 
implausible solution. After all, we are talking about one mental state, 
so it is an obvious requirement to say something about how the sides 
involved in that state exist together.      
However, I do not regard this as a daunting obstacle. There are 
proposed solutions in the literature both on the naturalist and the 
non-naturalist side (for a recent naturalist attempt see Copp 2001). 
My concern is driven more by two corresponding problems. First, 
the position as described here seems unstable. For it is just difficult 
to see what explanatory advantage non-descriptivist naturalism has 
over non-cognitivism and descriptivist naturalism. Accounting for 
motivational judgment internalism – the thesis that normative 
judgments necessarily motivate - is a good candidate, but non-
cognitivism takes this hurdle by construction, whereas descriptivist 
naturalism has its own solutions (e.g. Smith 1994, pp. 177-181; 
Jackson 1998, pp. 157-160). At the same time, both rival accounts 
are simpler. Non-cognitivism can do without any me taphysical 
commitment, while not denying that ethical claims may refer to plain 
natural facts; and descriptivist naturalism can do without any non-
descriptivist commitment, while not denying that ethical claims may 
have motivational aspects. The question therefore is what 
explanatory work is left for the additional features of non-descriptive 
naturalism to do, and the answers seems to be that none.   
The third problem takes us back to the context of the triviality 
objection. Recall the way non-descriptive naturalism aims to 
overcome the objection. It says that while the agent’s reasoning 
begins with purely descriptive premises, his conclusion will be an 
ethical claim that has a non-descriptive aspect as well. But it is 
unclear whether this response delivers, by the theory’s own light, the 
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result it is intended to. For the objection’s driving thought is that 
naturalism cannot bridge the gap between the agent’s non-normative 
premise and his normative conclusion because the latter simply 
repeats the former. Now it is true that the theory under discussion 
adds something to the agent’s reasoning, namely that its conclusion 
is not purely descriptive. Yet, it is unclear whether thereby it also 
bridges the gap between the normative and the non-normative. After 
all, non-descriptive naturalism is still a realist theory, hence it must 
explain normativity with reference to a fact of the world, in this case 
the natural world. But if ethical judgments become ethical and thus 
normative by virtue of representing certain natural facts (this is their 
primary semantic role), the non-descriptive element of naturalism 
will not add anything normatively significant to the agent’s 
reasoning. Therefore it is at least unclear whether non-descriptive 
naturalism faces up to the triviality objection in the first place.  
I don’t see how naturalists can deny this.11 They just cannot 
take the alternative way because that would be endorsing something 
like Allan Gibbard’s revised account of his non-cognitivism. 
(Gibbard 2003, Chapters 1, 2, 9) He too accepts non-analytic 
naturalism but gives it a non-cognitivist turn, holding that 
normativity is best captured by a non-cognitivist analysis (as he 
earlier put it, our normative terms carry an element of endorsement 
that only non-cognitivism can capture). This would be a way of 
bridging the gap the triviality objection uncovers; but this would also 
be a non-cognitivist and not a naturalist way to do this. 
Alternatively, the non-descriptivist naturalist might try to give us a 
hybrid account of normativity. But I just don’t see how this would 
go: how can one claim that normativity is descriptive and non-
descriptive at the same time? How can he marry the two without 
giving up one of them? Finally, there is the possibility of claiming 
that the presence of the given natural property only signals the 
presence of normativity: normativity itself still follows a non-
descriptivist analysis. However, this is nothing else but a 
sophisticated (or, in any case, a more complicated) version of a 
Gibbardian position and as such it invites the same assessment: it is 
not available to a ‘real’ naturalist.     
There is, however, a third response that is still open to the 
naturalist, even if he advocates reduction and descriptivism. He has 
to hold that ethical properties, though reduced to the natural, are 
                                                 
11 This short discussion has profited from conversations with Daniel Elstein.  
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nevertheless genuine properties with an independent role to play in 
human practice and discourse.12 Peter Railton calls this project 
vindicatory reductionism. He puts the idea in the following way: 
“[...] the naturalist who would vindicate the cognitive status of value 
judgments is not required to deny the possibility of reduction, for 
some reductions are vindications – they provide us with reason to 
think the reduced phenomena are genuine.” (Railton 1990, 161) 
And, at another place, he says: “Some reductions explain away the 
reduced phenomenon, but others simply explain it – and thereby 
show it to be well-founded.” (Railton 1993b, p. 317) 
To support his case Railton brings examples. The reduction of 
water to H2O or the reduction of salt to NaCl, he says, reinforces 
rather than impugns our sense that there really is water or salt. In 
short, it is vindicatory not eliminative. Similarly, to take an example 
from navigation, the reduction of seaworthiness to a set of physically 
realized dispositional properties of vessels, does not eliminate talk of 
seaworthiness; instead, it vindicates our use of the term. (Railton 
1990, p. 166) We can find counterexamples too, cases when the 
reduction did (or would, if proposed) eliminate the reduced term: 
phlogiston, caloric fluid, vital force, polywater, the non-divine 
reduction of the sacred are all like that. Hence, Railton points out, 
whether a reduction is vindicative or eliminative will depend on the 
specific character of what is being reduced and what the reduction 
basis looks like.” (Ibid. p. 161)       
This is still vague. What makes a reduction in one case 
eliminative and vindicative in the other? The key term is ‘vindicative 
information’. The idea is that vindicative reductions provide us with 
crucial information about the notion reduced by placing it in the 
world in an unproblematic way. (Railton 1993b, p. 318) Take the 
reduction of water to H2O. In knowing that water is water, what we 
knew was that water is the colourless liquid that flows in rivers, falls 
from clouds as rain, etc. But in coming to know that water is H2O, 
we were told that water is a substance whose molecules consist of 
two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom. This is an 
important piece of information that explains why water exists and 
takes the form as it does. Hence, though the facts reported are the 
same, it is important that they can be reported in some other way: for 
such possibility conveys vindicative information. As opposed to this, 
                                                 
12 It was Krister Bykvist whose remarks prompted me to consider this response.  
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eliminative reductions either do not produce any information or, if 
they do, it is such that it proves the reduced notion to be redundant 
or non-existent. 
An important element is still missing. Railton himself is a non-
analytical naturalist and this may suggest that vindicatory 
reductionism is open only to non-analytical views. It might be 
claimed that what matters is reality, not how reality can be 
described. It is unimportant whether we can say the same thing, or 
express the same concept, by using different words. But it may have 
great importance whether, when we say two different things, or use 
two different concepts, we are referring to the same property, or 
reporting the same fact. Truths about properties are truths about 
reality.13 I don’t think this is so. Let me put the idea of vindicatory 
reductionism in a different way. Recall our claim that Joe’s practical 
reasoning is trivial because his conclusion adds nothing to his 
premise. Now we see that, on the non-analytical reading at least, this 
may not be so. For on this reading Joe’s premise and his conclusion 
employ different concepts and this means that their content is given 
by different propositions (for this view of the identity of propositions 
see Schick 1991, pp. 72-8). What we have here then is a case of co-
reportive propositions, which, we just saw, can be significant if the 
information it produces is vindicative not eliminative.    
However, and this seems to be behind the point above, no such 
thing happens in the analytical case since here we have the same 
concepts, thus no co-reporting propositions are present. This is 
certainly so, but this need not rule out the possibility of producing 
vindicative information. What contemporary analytical naturalists 
claim is that by using conceptual analysis we can get a clearer view 
on concepts we are otherwise familiar with. This is because many 
facts about these concepts are hidden in the unobvious, opaque 
conceptual relations of what Jackson calls ‘mature folk morality’: 
the morality that we end up with after debate and critical reflection. 
(Jackson 1998, p. 151) As a result, though analytical views lack the 
sort of metaphysical background – in the form of separate but co-
reporting propositions – that non-analytical accounts share, they may 
still be vindicative. This happens when they come up with an 
analysis of a normative concept, which is such that it brings extra 
                                                 
13 Originally this claim appeared in Chapter 2 of the earlier draft of Parfit (ms). But, 
as has been noted previously, this chapter is no longer included in Parfit’s manuscript. 
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information in the way mentioned above. The failure of vindication 
does not follow from the mere fact of analyticity. 
   
III. Conclusion 
 
The possibility of informative reduction provides metaphysical 
grounds for vindication. It shows that it can matter whether some 
fact can be reported in a different way or that the term some fact 
refers to has a synonym or implies another in meaning. This brings 
with it an important reduction in the scope of Parfit’s charge. While 
the triviality objection was presented as a knockdown objection 
against naturalism per se, the possibility of vindicative reduction 
makes the success of the objection depend on a meticulous case by 
case analysis. For what we have to do now is to fill up with content 
the clause ‘informative in a vindicatory way’. Conditions are needed 
that can serve as constraints on the possibility of vindication, and 
then we have to show that the particular reduction naturalists 
propose does not meet these conditions.14 This task, however, should 
wait for another occasion; until then, Parfit’s charge remains a 
serious but not yet fulfilled promise to refute naturalism. 15 
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